Defence and Security (UK White Paper)

Security Partnership

The UK has already set out an ambitious vision for the UK’s future security relationship with the EU.The UK recognises that leaving the EU means the security relationship between the UK and the EU cannot continue on the same basis as before. Nevertheless, given shared interests and threats, the UK seeks an ambitious partnership covering the breadth of security interests including foreign policy, defence, development, law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation.

It should be supported by ongoing cooperation through partnership programmes and key safeguards such as individual rights, data protection and robust governance arrangements, to underpin the trust which is essential to such a close relationship.

The future security partnership needs to protect citizens across Europe, including the 3.5 million EU citizens living in the UK and approximately 800,000 UK nationals living in the EU. The ability to protect citizens within Europe is increasingly intertwined with broader foreign policy, defence and development objectives outside Europe.

It is necessary to have a single, coherent security partnership between the UK and the EU to address: the roots of terrorism and prevent attacks; identification of terrorists and efforts to bring them to justice; instability in the neighbourhood and work to prevent offering a haven for organised crime; migration challenges affecting Europe; the provision of development funding across the world; and the use of data in a range of contexts.

The UK and the EU sit at the heart of the rules-based international system as champions of multilateralism. The security partnership should reinforce the UK’s and the EU’s network of international relationships, including the UK’s role as a leading NATO Ally and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The UK will work alongside the EU and its Member States in international fora such as the United Nations (UN), G7, G20, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to promote global security and prosperity, and to hold to account those who seek to do the UK and its allies harm.

Principles of Security Relationship

The UK’s vision for the future security relationship is underpinned by five key principles. The relationship should:

  • protect shared operational capabilities that keep people safe. Working together through different structures should not be at the expense of protecting the public. The shared tools, measures, initiatives and capabilities that have been developed over the last 40 years have been proven to save lives. The UK proposals are both legally viable and operationally important.
  • respect the sovereignty of the UK and the autonomy of EU decision making. The UK will play no formal role in EU decision making and will make independent decisions in foreign policy, defence and development. National security will remain the sole responsibility of the UK and the Member States respectively. These proposals ensure that the UK and the EU can continue to work together where it is mutually beneficial.
  • have an institutional framework that delivers a practical and flexible partnership. The UK proposal is for scalable arrangements that would ensure the UK and the EU can combine efforts to the greatest effect, and can be intensified when a crisis or serious incident occurs.
  • be dynamic and keep pace with growing global challenges and evolving threats. Where the UK participates in EU measures as part of its future relationship, it is in the shared interest of the UK and the EU to ensure that as these measures evolve, or new measures are introduced, consideration can be given to continued cooperation with the UK.
  • be underpinned by appropriate safeguards: respect for human rights, comprehensive data protection arrangements and robust, appropriate governance arrangements. The UK is committed to membership of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The UK also has very high standards of data protection in line with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Law Enforcement Directive and intends to remain a global leader in data protection standards. The UK’s approach to data protection is set out in another chapter and this would underpin the data flows and protections necessary to support the security partnership. The UK proposes that robust governance arrangements should be established, appropriate to the security arrangements agreed by the UK and the EU, as set out in another chapter

To deliver on these principles, the security partnership should:

  • be informed by the UK’s and the EU’s shared security context, recognising the links between the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2018 UK National Security Capability Review (NSCR), and their assessments of threats at home and overseas;
  • protect shared law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation capabilities, including the ability to share time-sensitive data and information, practical cooperation to investigate serious criminality and terrorism, and cooperation through the EU agencies Europol and Eurojust;
  • continue cooperation on foreign policy, defence and development, including consultation on the global challenges that the UK and the EU face, coordination where it is more effective to work side-by-side, and capability development to deliver the means to tackle current and future threats; and
  • support joint action on wider security issues, including asylum and illegal migration, cybersecurity, cooperation on counter-terrorism, civil protection and health security.

The security partnership will be a core pillar of the future relationship between the UK and the EU. The UK and the EU share the objective of an ambitious future relationship which protects the safety and interests of EU and UK citizens.

Shared security context

The UK and the EU share a common assessment of threats, as set out in the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2018 UK National Security Capability Review (NSCR):

  • The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability. The threat of Islamist terrorism, demonstrated in despicable attacks across Europe, is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Extreme right-wing terrorism also continues to be a growing threat. Protracted conflicts, including those ongoing in the Middle East, Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, have destroyed basic social infrastructure, stalled education, created large-scale humanitarian and development need and hampered economic growth. This drives migration, with criminals exploiting the vulnerable including through human trafficking and modern slavery. Conflict and instability can also allow terrorists and organised crime groups to thrive.
  • The resurgence of state-based threats. There is a well-established pattern of Russian State aggression and disruption, including Russia’s indiscriminate and reckless use of a military-grade nerve agent on British soil, the illegal annexation of Crimea, the fomenting of conflict in the Donbas, support to the Assad regime and a sustained campaign of cyber espionage. North Korea has flagrantly violated international law through repeated nuclear and missile tests. Iran’s destabilising activity in the Middle East continues. Competition between states in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, including in the South China Sea, increases tensions and the risk of conflict.
  • The erosion of the rules-based international order the UK and the EU seek to uphold, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats. This is most clearly evidenced by the repeated stalemates in the Security Council on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
  • The ongoing growth in serious and organised crime and its impact on security and prosperity. Serious and organised crime is inherently transnational and many of the threats the UK and the EU face within Europe emanate from overseas. Organised crime groups have a daily, corrosive impact on public services and infrastructure. The same forces that benefit legitimate business, globalisation and technological change, make organised criminal networks and markets more resilient. Wider economic cooperation is more important than ever in tackling anti-money laundering regimes.
  • The impact of technology, especially cyber threats and wider technological developments. Malicious cyber activity knows no international boundaries and has grown in terms of intensity, complexity and severity over the course of the last year. There are several established and capable states that seek to target and exploit the UK and European networks and devices to gather intelligence or intellectual property. Indiscriminate, disruptive incidents cost billions in damage to Europe’s economy. The proliferation of low-cost, high-end commercial capabilities, novel weapons and sophisticated data-driven technologies, including autonomous systems are also changing the security environment.
  • Diseases, natural hazards and deliberate threats affecting the UK and the EU. No country is immune to an infectious disease in another part of the world. The Ebola outbreak in 2014 is just one example of this threat, where cooperation between the UK, Member States and the European Commission mobilised international resources and helped halt the spread of the disease across West Africa.

The world is becoming more complex and volatile. These complex and overlapping challenges are likely to remain security priorities for the UK and the EU over the next decade. To respond effectively will require a transformative approach, using the  widest possible range of capabilities at the disposal of the UK and the EU. They require an unprecedented depth and breadth of cooperation to keep people safe across the whole of the continent.

Foreign policy, defence and development

The UK, the EU and its Member States share values and interests. The UK deploys significant assets, expertise, intelligence and capabilities to protect and promote them. The UK will remain a committed partner, including as a leading NATO Ally and a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

The UK and the EU share a range of ever-evolving global security threats. To respond to these challenges, the UK proposes continued consultation, development of shared capabilities and combining efforts to the greatest effect where it is in the UK’s and the EU’s shared interest.

The UK, therefore, proposes a tailored partnership with the EU covering:

  • consultation and regular dialogue on geographic and thematic issues and the global challenges the UK and the EU face;
  • mechanisms to discuss and coordinate the implementation of existing and new sanctions;
  • arrangements to enable cooperation on crisis management operations, including using civilian and military assets and capabilities to promote global peace and stability, where it is mutually beneficial;
  • d commitments to support a collaborative and inclusive approach to European capability development and planning;
  • commitments to continue to work together to address global development challenges, supporting a cooperative accord between the UK and the EU on the development and external programming;
  • continued cooperation on EU strategic space projects, including their security aspects; and
  • a Security of Information Agreement that facilitates the sharing of information and
  • intelligence

The partnership should be based on common values of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the protection of shared interests. It will need to be flexible and scalable, allowing the UK and the EU to respond effectively to emerging threats and international crises as they arise.

Future UK-EU foreign policy, defence and development cooperation is likely to require a combination of formal agreements enabling coordination on a case-by-case basis. Given the particular intergovernmental nature of foreign and defence policy, it is especially important that the partnership must respect the sovereignty of the UK and the autonomy of the EU and its Member States.

The UK and the EU agree that arrangements for future cooperation on foreign and defence policy could come into effect during the implementation period. This would allow the UK and the EU to benefit from closer, more intense and more productive cooperation than the EU enjoys with any other partner. It would ensure that there is no drop off in mutual efforts to support European security and that the UK and the EU remain able to respond most effectively to crises ahead.

Consultation and coordination

Consultation is vital for an effective foreign, defence and development policy partnership that allows the UK, the EU and its Member States to combine efforts around the world to the greatest effect and achieve common objectives.

The future security partnership should enable flexible responses where different situations and policy issues require them.The UK proposes:

  • consultation across all foreign policy areas, with regular dialogue between officials, ad hoc invitations to meetings, for example to the Political and Security Committee in informal sessions, provisions for discussion between EU27 leaders and the UK Prime Minister and at other political levels;
  • information and intelligence sharing, for example through the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN),69 European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN) and EU Military Staff (EUMS);
  • reciprocal exchange of expertise and personnel in areas of mutual interest and collaboration, which would enable greater understanding between the UK and the EU and thus facilitate practical cooperation; and
  • cooperation in multilateral fora, such as the UN, G7, G20, IMF, OECD, OSCE and World Bank, and in third countries, to enable the use of other foreign policy levers,including an option to agree shared positions and statements, joint demarches

The EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) is an intelligence body of the External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union (EU) under the authority of the EU’s High Representative

The European Satellite Centre (SATCEN) supports the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by providing services based on space assets and collateral data

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is the Directorate-General of the European Union’s (EU) External Action Service (EEAS) that contributes to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by providing strategic advice to the High Representative (HR/VP) and jointly organised events, as well as cooperation on consular provision and protection.

Much of this can be done within existing third-country precedents in this area. Where the UK proposes going beyond these, it does so to reflect the unprecedented nature of the UK-EU security relationship, given its starting point, potential scale and the shared values and interests. The proposals described above are fundamental to working together as close partners around the world.


Sanctions are a key foreign policy tool and are most effective when designed and applied alongside international partners. As well as communicating a clear political signal, sanctions can be used to constrain or help effect a change in behaviour.

The UK currently implements over 30 sanctions regimes targeting approximately 2,000 people or entities.72 Around half of these are UN sanctions73 and the rest are EU-coordinated.

The UK’s new Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides for national powers to impose sanctions. These powers will enable the UK to act in support of foreign policy objectives, including in partnership with others.

In future, it will be in the UK’s and the EU’s mutual interest to discuss sanctions policy and decide where and how to combine efforts to the greatest effect.

Consultation and cooperation on sanctions should therefore include:

  • agreement to exchange information on listings, and their justification, as well as technical support;
  • UK-EU dialogue on future designations and regimes; and
  • intensive interaction to support coordination between the UK and the EU and the adoption of mutually supportive sanctions, including during crises.

Operations and missions

The UK will continue to collaborate with European allies and partners on military and civilian operations around the world. UK armed forces are engaged in active duties across the globe, including degrading and defeating Daesh in Iraq, providing humanitarian aid and combating the international drugs trade.

NATO will remain the cornerstone of European defence and security, supported by strong multilateral75 and bilateral alliances and partnerships. The EU has an  important, complementary role to play, including helping to prevent crises, countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience and stabilising post-conflict situations.

The UK therefore proposes:

  • arrangements to enable cooperation on crisis management operations, including using civilian and military assets and capabilities to promote global peace and stability, where it is mutually beneficial; and
  • intensifying cooperation when needed, including during times of crisis.

There are opportunities to build on existing precedents for third country participation in EU operations and missions, for example through an enhanced Framework Participation Agreement.

The UK welcomes the recent proposals from the EU for a more differentiated approach to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) partnerships. The UK’s involvement would be decided on a case-by-case basis so as not to prejudice the sovereignty of the UK or the decision making autonomy of the EU.

Using assets and capabilities in mutual interest

UK expertise and assets make a significant contribution to the EU’s ability to deploy crisis management missions across the world. In the future, UK contributions could range from the provision of specific expertise and intelligence to the deployment of personnel, specialist assets or operational enablers, such as strategic airlift. The UK could also use its diplomatic network to support EU operations. The UK has offered to host an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and consider future contributions to EU Battlegroups as part of the enhanced future partnership.

Any UK decision to deploy armed forces must be taken on the basis of adequate information and consultation. This is the case for the UK in any international operation. In order to enable the EU to make the best use of UK assets, the UK would require sufficient insight, including access to planning documents. The UK could bring its significant expertise to support EU operational planning. This does not undermine the important principle that only EU Member States have a formal role in the decision-making process and a vote over the launch of EU operations.

Capability development

Collaboration on defence and security capabilities will ensure that armed forces remain capable and interoperable, that the best use of defence budgets is made and that support is given to the innovation and global competitiveness of the European defence industrial base, putting European defence industry in the best place to compete in the global market. Europe’s ability to act autonomously and effectively will be enhanced with the UK at the EU’s side.

The UK’s defence research and development spending represent around 40 per cent of the EU’s total.77 All of Europe benefits from the strength of this sector. European collaboration has led to the development of cutting-edge technologies; for example, Meteor, a world-leading air-to-air missile, is the result of collaboration between six European nations and has generated significant export orders. The future security partnership should support a collaborative and inclusive approach to European capability development and planning, including:

  • exchange and growth of expertise, through regular technical knowledge sharing, supported by UK liaison presence;
  • collaboration on specific projects, programmes and initiatives, including through the European Defence Agency (EDA),78 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO),through a cooperative accord on defence research and development, and the European Defence Fund (EDF); and
  • provisions to ensure a competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

Collaboration on specific projects, programmes and initiatives

Future UK participation in EDA programmes and initiatives will be beneficial for both parties. There are precedents, for example via a third country Administrative Arrangement.80 The UK is also open to continue contributing to the EU’s Force Catalogue81 to support the EU’s assessment and prioritisation of its capability requirements. Proposals for the UK’s participation in the EDF are set out in other sections.

Defence capability development is an area where EU structures are evolving, which underlines the importance of a flexible partnership. The development of PESCO provides new opportunities to strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities, for example through improvements to military mobility within and beyond the EU. The UK supported PESCO’s launch and wants to see it develop in a way that is coherent with NATO.

The EU is developing proposals for third country participation in both PESCO and EDF. Current EDF proposals would limit the potential for third-country involvement. The UK will work constructively with the EU to develop arrangements to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation in future, respecting the EU’s decision making autonomy.

These arrangements should ensure that Member States can benefit from the EDF, while also working closely with third country partners on projects of mutual interest. The UK is seeking the best possible deal for the European defence industry and the UK’s and the EU’s mutual prosperity and security.

European Defence Technological and Industrial Base

The UK and the EU will both benefit from a globally competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base that ensures armed forces have the equipment they need. The future security partnership should support the effective operation and collaboration of UK and EU defence companies, facilitating complex supply chains. It should also ensure that the UK and the Member States can work together on research and development projects, in support of the cooperative accord set out in another section.

Development and External Programmes

The UK and the EU are both global development actors and share the same commitment to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals, direct development expertise and spend to alleviate poverty.

The UK and the EU should seek to pool resources and exchange expertise to deliver the maximum impact from combined development assistance. There is a strong case for close collaboration in the areas of peace and security, humanitarian aid and migration. The UK is open to collaboration in other areas, and working closely with the EU to contribute to the EU’s development and external programmes and instruments, where the EU and UK agree.

The UK, therefore, proposes a cooperative accord with the EU,  that will allow for UK participation in specific EU programmes, instruments or bespoke projects, with appropriate influence and oversight.

The UK will critically assess the rationale for close collaboration depending on the situation and be rigorous in assessing whether each contribution to the EU offers value for money.


The UK and the EU are both reliant on access to space technologies for national resilience and military capabilities, and to reduce vulnerability to threats such as hacking and severe space weather.

The UK and the EU should continue to cooperate closely on relevant space technologies, through continued UK participation in EU space programmes, including Galileo, the EU Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that, once fully operational, will provide accurate position, navigation and timing information. It will benefit governments, citizens and industry alike.

The UK wants Galileo to be a core component of the future security partnership. The UK’s continued participation in Galileo is in the mutual interests of the UK and the EU, benefitting European competitiveness, security, capability development and interoperability. An end to close UK participation would be to the detriment of Europe’s prosperity and security and could result in delays and additional costs to the programme.

However, at present, there is a fundamental difference of views between the UK and the EU about the conditions under which the UK could participate in Galileo. The UK has put forward proposals which are intended to respect the EU’s decision making autonomy and establish a balance of rights, distinct from Member State access, and obligations. These include a UK ability to independently assure the integrity of the system, so the UK can rely on it for strategic defence and security purposes.

The EU has put forward proposals which have the effect of ending UK participation. This would be to the detriment of Europe’s security and prosperity. The UK and the EU must work through issues relating to access to security-related elements of the programme urgently in the framework of negotiations on the security partnership.

The UK’s clear preference remains to participate in Galileo, in a new balance of rights and obligations, after it has left the EU. The programme must also offer value for money to justify an ongoing UK contribution. As a logical consequence of the exclusion and uncertainty surrounding future UK participation, the UK is exploring alternatives to fulfil its needs for secure and resilient position, navigation and timing information.

Wider security issues

There are a number of wider security issues beyond those in the preceding sections which are important to European security and which should be addressed as part of the future security partnership.

This chapter sets out the UK’s approach for continued cooperation, covering:

  • asylum and illegal migration, where the UK proposes taking a ‘whole of route’ approach to tackle the causes of illegal migration, agree a framework to return illegal migrants and ensure unaccompanied asylum-seeking children can be reunited with families in the UK;
  • a new UK-EU strategic dialogue on cybersecurity to continue close cooperation in specific EU programmes, and agree on a framework to work together internationally to promote shared values;
  • a new UK-EU framework for dialogue on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, working together on emerging threats, new capabilities and new opportunities where it is mutually beneficial;
  • continued support and expertise in civil protection and participation as a third country in a civil protection mechanism; and
  • ongoing work with key EU agencies on health security to enable information sharing and access to key datasets.

Asylum and illegal migration

Properly managed migration brings benefits to local communities and economies. But high levels of illegal migration present a global challenge, enabling organised crime, people trafficking and modern slavery to prosper.

The UK has a significant presence overseas, conducting capacity and capability building in source and transit countries and deconstructing criminal business models, through participation in development programmes and through seconded national experts. It is vital that the UK and the EU establish a new, strategic relationship to address the global challenges of asylum and illegal migration.

The UK, therefore, proposes a comprehensive, ‘whole of route’ approach that includes interventions at every stage of the migrant journey and ensure no new incentives are created to make dangerous journeys to Europe. It should cover:

  • ongoing operational cooperation, for example, working with Frontex to strengthen the EU’s external border, and Europol to combat organised immigration crime;
  • a new legal framework to return illegal migrants and asylum-seekers to a country they have travelled through, or have a connection with, in order to have their protection claim considered, where necessary. People should be prevented from making claims in more than one country, and on multiple occasions. A clear legal structure, facilitated by access to Eurodac (the biometric and fingerprint database used for evidencing secondary asylum claims) or an equivalent system will help achieve this;
  • new arrangements that enable unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in the EU to join close family members in the UK, where it is in their best interests and vice versa;
  • a continued strategic partnership to address the drivers of illegal migration by investing and building cooperation in source and transit countries;
  • continued UK participation in international dialogues with European and African partners, frameworks, and processes, such as the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, to tackle illegal migration upstream; and
  • the option to align and work together on potential future funding instruments through the cooperative accord on overseas development assistance and international action.


There is a significant cyber threat to the UK and its European allies from state actors and cybercriminals. The UK has played a leading role in developing Europe’s approach to cybersecurity with the EU institutions themselves, such as the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, and with related bodies and the Member States in sharing threat intelligence and responding operationally to cyber attacks affecting Europe.

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) should continue to work with the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) to share information on cyber incidents. The National Crime Agency, one of Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre’s most effective partners, will continue to allow the UK and the Member States to  bring criminals to justice and combat cross-border crime effectively.

The UK shares a significant volume of classified threat intelligence assessments with European allies. For example, the NCSC, part of the UK’s intelligence agency GCHQ, shares cyber-related threat intelligence with INTCEN and EU Member States alike.

While that cooperation will continue, the UK proposes going further through:

  • close collaboration between the UK and the Network and Information Security (NIS) Cooperation Group, Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) Network and the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA); and
  • building on existing cooperation to identify opportunities to work together through a regular strategic dialogue and to promote and uphold shared values and beliefs that existing international law applies to cyberspace, underpinned by a vision of a “free, open, peaceful and secure global cyberspace”.

Counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism

Terrorists do not recognise international borders. While the UK’s main operational cooperation on counter-terrorism exists via bilateral and multilateral fora outside of the EU, the law enforcement tools and systems that the UK has developed with the EU strengthen the UK’s and the EU’s ability to counter the terrorist threat.

The UK’s contribution to, and participation in, EU tools and measures provides important additional counterterrorism capabilities beyond what is available bilaterally between the UK and Member States’ operational agencies. Cooperation between the UK and the EU using SIS II and the EU PNR framework are particularly important to protect the public across Europe from terrorist attacks. The UK contribution to Member States’ coordination through the EU Internet Forum has also led to increased pressure on communication service providers (CSPs) to deliver on their commitments to prevent terrorist use of their platforms and improve transparency.

The UK is committed to a security partnership with the EU, including Ireland, that will allow the Police Service of Northern Ireland to continue to tackle security threats, including the severe threat from dissident republicans, and serious and organised crime. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland and Ireland is vital to suppressing terrorism and will continue to be so after the UK leaves the EU.

Our new relationship should be dynamic and adaptable to respond to evolving threats. It should also enable the sharing of best practice and expertise on key issues and themes relevant to counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, and assessment sharing and cooperation through the appropriate intelligence analysis bodies, such as INTCEN.

To support the shared aim of fighting terrorism and countering violent extremism, the UK proposes a framework for dialogue to work together on emerging threats, new capabilities and new opportunities where it is in the UK’s and the EU’s mutual interest.

Civil protection

Natural and man-made disasters can occur at any moment. They can cause not only economic and environmental damage but more importantly loss of lives. Civil protection assistance consists of governmental aid delivered in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. This emergency relief can take the form of in-kind assistance, deployment of specially-equipped teams, or assessment and coordination by experts sent to the field.

The UK has been, and remains, one of the most active countries in civil protection. Between 2013 and 2017 the UK sent thousands of tonnes of assistance items and more than 1,200 experts for emergency responses.

The UK proposes to:

  • continue to support the Member States, the EU and other international partners with respect to preparedness and response; and
  • participate as a third country in a civil protection mechanism, which supports European nations in preparing for and responding to disasters, benefitting the security of citizens across Europe and more globally.

Health security

Infectious diseases and other factors harmful to human health and life, whether from natural sources, accidental releases or deliberate actions, are geographical threats that require global responses.

The UK has worked closely with EU partners to make sure systems and infrastructure are in place to protect citizens within the UK, the EU and beyond from health threats that do not recognise borders. Maintaining the ability to act in a similar way in the future is key to protecting citizens. The UK proposes:

continuing close collaboration with the Health Security Committee and bodies such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), including access to all associated alert systems, databases and networks, to allow the UK and the EU Member States to coordinate national responses;

  1. ongoing cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to combat the harm caused by illicit drugs;
  2. collaboration with the European laboratory surveillance networks to monitor the spread of diseases across Europe; and
  3. continued collaboration between the EU and the devolved administrations in these areas, including direct sharing of information with ECDC and the ability for Microbiology Reference Laboratories in Glasgow, and Public Health Wales, to provide European Public Health Microbiology (EUPHEM) training.

This Article draws on the White Paper The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister July 2018 Cm 9593. UK public sector information is reproduced pursuant to the Open Government Licence  The Legal Materials contain UK public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. The Licence is available  at (the UK Licence).


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