PART III: SECURITY

PART 1. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

110. With a view to the Union’s security and the safety of its citizens, the Parties should establish a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership. This partnership will take into account geographic proximity and evolving threats, including serious international crime, organised crime, terrorism, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, hybrid-threats, the erosion of the rules-based international order and the resurgence of state-based threats.

111. The envisaged partnership should reaffirm the Parties’ commitment to promoting global security, prosperity and effective multilateralism, underpinned by their shared principles, values and interests. The security partnership should comprise law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy, security and defence, as well as thematic cooperation in areas of common interest.

2. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

112. The security partnership should provide for close law enforcement and judicial cooperation in relation to the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, taking into account the United Kingdom’s future status of a nonSchengen third country that does not provide for the free movement of persons. The security partnership should ensure reciprocity, preserve the autonomy of the Union’s decision-making and the integrity of its legal order and take account of the fact that a third country cannot enjoy the same rights and benefits as a Member State.

113. The envisaged partnership should be underpinned by commitments to respect fundamental rights including adequate protection of personal data, which is an enabler for the cooperation. In this context, the envisaged partnership should provide for automatic termination of the law enforcement cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters if the United Kingdom were to denounce the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). It should also provide for automatic suspension if the United Kingdom were to abrogate domestic law giving effect to the ECHR, thus making it impossible for individuals to invoke the rights under the ECHR before the United Kingdom’s courts. The level of ambition of the law enforcement and judicial cooperation envisaged in the security partnership will be dependent on the level of protection of personal data ensured in the United Kingdom. The Commission will work toward an adequacy decision to facilitate such cooperation, if applicable conditions are met. The envisaged partnership should provide for suspension of the law enforcement and judicial cooperation set out in the security partnership, if the adequacy decision is repealed or suspended by the Commission or declared invalid by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The security partnership should also provide for judicial guarantees for a fair trial, including procedural rights, e.g. effective access to a lawyer. It should also lay down appropriate grounds for refusal of a request for cooperation, including where such request concerns a person who has been finally convicted or acquitted for the same facts in a Member State or the United Kingdom.

A. Data exchange

114. The envisaged partnership should establish arrangements for timely, effective, efficient and reciprocal exchanges between Passenger Information Units of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data and of the results of processing such data stored in respective national PNR processing systems. It should also provide a basis for transfers of PNR data by air carriers to the United Kingdom for the flights between the United Kingdom and a Member State. Such arrangements should comply with the relevant requirements, including those set out in the Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU.

115. The envisaged partnership should provide for arrangements between the Parties ensuring reciprocal access to data available at the national level on DNA and fingerprints of suspected and convicted individuals as well as vehicle registration data (Prüm).

116. Without prejudice to the exchange of law enforcement information through Interpol, Europol, bilateral and international agreements, the envisaged partnership should provide for simplified exchanges of existing information and intelligence between the United Kingdom and Member States law enforcement authorities, with the view of delivering capabilities that, in so far as is technically and legally possible, and considered necessary and in the Union’s interest, approximate those enabled by Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. This would include information on wanted and missing persons and objects.

B. Operational cooperation between law enforcement authorities and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

117. The envisaged partnership should provide for cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europol and Eurojust in line with arrangements for the cooperation with third countries set out in relevant Union legislation.

118. The envisaged partnership should establish effective arrangements based on streamlined procedures subject to judicial control and time limits enabling the United Kingdom and Union Member States to surrender suspected and convicted persons efficiently and expeditiously, with the possibilities to waive the requirement of double criminality for certain offences, and to determine the applicability of these arrangements to own nationals and for political offences.

119. To ensure effective and efficient practical cooperation between law enforcement and judicial authorities in criminal matters, the envisaged partnership should facilitate and supplement, where necessary, the application of relevant Council of Europe conventions, including by imposing time limits and providing for standard forms. It should also cover necessary supplementary forms of mutual legal assistance and arrangements appropriate for the United Kingdom future status, including on joint investigation teams and the latest technological advancements, with a view to delivering capabilities that, in so far as is technically and legally possible and considered necessary and in the Union’s interest, approximate those enabled by the Union instruments.

120. Supplementing and facilitating the application of the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 and its Additional Protocols, the envisaged partnership should put in place arrangements on exchange of information on criminal records appropriate to the United Kingdom’s future status with the view of delivering capabilities that, in so far as technically and legally possible and considered necessary and in the Union’s interest, approximate those enabled by the Union instrument. C. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing

121. The envisaged partnership should include commitments to support international efforts to prevent and fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, particularly through compliance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. The provisions in the envisaged partnership should go beyond the FATF standards on beneficial ownership information, among others by providing for the existence of public registers for beneficial ownership information for companies and semi-public registers of beneficial ownership information for trusts and other legal arrangements.

3. FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY AND DEFENCE

122. The envisaged partnership should provide for an ambitious, close and lasting cooperation on external action to protect citizens from external threats, prevent conflicts, strengthen international peace and security and address the root causes of global challenges.

123. The envisaged partnership should preserve the autonomy of the Union’s decisionmaking, including the shaping of its foreign policy, security and defence. The envisaged partnership should respect the legal order of the Union as well as its strategic and security interests.

124. When and where the United Kingdom has shared interests with the Union, the envisaged partnership should enable the United Kingdom as a third country to cooperate with the Union. 125. Making full use of the existing framework to cooperate with third countries, including through the United Nations and the NATO, the partnership should enable appropriate dialogue, consultation, exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms that are flexible, scalable and proportionate to the level of engagement of the United Kingdom alongside the Union.

A. Consultation and cooperation

126. The envisaged partnership should enable structured consultations between the Union and the United Kingdom through the Political Dialogue on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as sectoral dialogues. The Parties may put into operation such structured consultations, where appropriate, before the end of the transition period.

127. The envisaged partnership should enable cooperation between the Union and the United Kingdom in third countries, including on consular protection, and in international organisations, notably in the framework of the United Nations, with a view to combining efforts in external action and management of global challenges.

B. Sanctions

128. To enable the alignment of the United Kingdom with the Union sanction policy, when and where foreign policy objectives are shared, the envisaged partnership should facilitate dialogue and mutual exchange of information between the Union and the United Kingdom at appropriate stages of the policy cycle of their respective sanction regimes.

C. Operations and missions

129. The envisaged partnership should establish a framework in line with existing rules to enable the United Kingdom to participate on a case-by-case basis, and upon invitation by the Union, in CSDP missions and operations open to third countries.

130. Under this framework and in the context of a CSDP mission or operation in which the United Kingdom participates, the envisaged partnership should provide for interaction and exchange of information with the United Kingdom that are proportionate to the level of the United Kingdom’s contribution.

D. Defence capabilities development

131. The envisaged partnership should preserve the strategic autonomy and freedom of action of the Union underpinned by its defence industrial base. Where it is in the industrial and technological interest of the Union, to facilitate the interoperability of the respective armed forces, the security partnership may enable if and to the extent possible under the conditions of Union law: a) The United Kingdom’s collaboration in the development of research and capability projects of the European Defence Agency (EDA) through an administrative arrangement; b) The participation of eligible United Kingdom entities in collaborative defence projects bringing together Union entities supported by the European Defence Fund; c) The participation of the United Kingdom on an exceptional basis in projects in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), where invited to participate by the Union.

132. The envisaged partnership should provide that any participation of the United Kingdom in activities of the EDA or the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) that are related to the Union’s wider policies should be in compliance with the participation rules defined in Union law.

E. Intelligence exchanges

133. The envisaged partnership should provide for the possibility of intelligence exchanges between the Union and the United Kingdom on a timely and voluntary reciprocal basis as appropriate, while preserving the autonomous production of intelligence products of the Union. Such intelligence exchanges should contribute to a shared understanding of Europe’s security environment and facilitate cooperation between the Union and the United Kingdom.

134. The envisaged partnership should enable the exchange of intelligence and sensitive information between the relevant Union institutions, bodies, office and agencies and the United Kingdom authorities. The envisaged partnership should provide for the cooperation between the United Kingdom and EUSC in line with the Council Decision on the establishment of the EUSC in the field of space-based imagery.

F. Space

135. The envisaged partnership should provide for the possibility for the United Kingdom to have access to the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) through provisions on PRS in accordance with Union law. Such provisions on PRS should allow the United Kingdom to secure access to the most resilient service of Galileo for sensitive applications in the context of Union operations or ad hoc operations involving its Member States.

136. Since access to the development of technologies is excluded, access to the Galileo PRS should be conditional upon: a) ensuring that the United Kingdom’s use of PRS does not contravene the essential security interests of the Union and its Member States; b) the United Kingdom participating in the non-security related activities of the Union’s Space Programme as foreseen in Section 2(A) of Part I on participation in Union programmes, unless and until the United Kingdom grants the Union access to the envisaged United Kingdom Global Navigation Satellite System.

G. Development cooperation

137. The envisaged partnership should enable the United Kingdom to contribute to the Union’s instruments and mechanisms in full respect of the autonomy of the Union in the programming of development priorities. The envisaged partnership should promote sustainable development and the eradication of poverty. In this regard, the partnership should provide for the continued support of the Parties for the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and European Consensus on Development.

4. THEMATIC COOPERATION

A. Cyber security

138. The envisaged partnership should enable a dialogue between the Union and the United Kingdom on cyber-security, including a cooperation to promote effective global practices on cyber security in relevant international bodies.

139. The envisaged partnership should enable the timely and reciprocal exchange of information between the Union and the United Kingdom on cyber-security, including on incidents and trends. 140. In this context, the envisaged partnership should enable cooperation ensuring reciprocity between the United Kingdom and the Computer Emergency Response Team – European Union (CERT-EU). It should enable the United Kingdom’s participation in relevant activities of the Cooperation Group established under the Union’s Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems and of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA).

B. Irregular migration

141. The envisaged partnership should envisage cooperation to tackle irregular migration, including its drivers and consequences, whilst recognising both the need to protect the most vulnerable and the United Kingdom’s future status of a non-Schengen third country that does not provide for the free movement of persons. This cooperation should cover: a) cooperation with Europol to combat organised immigration crime in line with arrangements for the cooperation with third countries set out in the relevant Union legislation; b) a dialogue on shared objectives and on cooperation, including in third countries and international fora, to tackle irregular migration upstream.